APB out on 2008 Michigan Offense

Oh, 3-9 Michigan offense of yesteryear, where art thou?

After just 2 games Michigan fans can see some significant differences in the performance of the Wolverines offense, aside from the obvious 2-0 start.

While it’s not 100% accurate (or necessarily fair) to compare Michigan’s first two 2008 opponents Utah (13-0) and Miami (OH) (2-10) with the first two 2009 opponents Western Michigan (0-2) and Notre Dame (1-1) and then make definitive conclusions from them, it is nevertheless very interesting to compare these identical slices of time and observe how Michigan’s offensive team firepower appears to have changed:

After 2 Games: 2009 Michigan Offense vs. 2008 Michigan Offense

Year	Rush. Yards	Pass. Yards	Total Yards	Pts	Plays	YPP	PPP	INT	Fum.	Total TO's	TOP
2008	214	270	484	39	116	4.17	0.34	1	2	3	48:53:00
2009	482	387	869	69	149	5.83	0.46	1	0	1	62:55:00
Variance	268	117	385	30	33	1.66	0.13	0	-2	-2	14:02:00

Key Observations after 2 Games:

1. RUSHING YARDS: Massive up tick in Michigan rushing yardage.
2. PASSING YARDS: Significant increase in Michigan passing yardage.
3. TOTAL YARDS: Whoa. Basically doubling of total yardage
4. POINTS SCORED: Whoa II. Almost doubling of points scored (30 more points than 2008).
   
5. PLAYS: Michigan is running more plays. More attempts, more opportunities.
6. YPP: Significant improvement in Yards Per Play (almost +2 yards more than same juncture in 2008)
7. PPP: Significant improvement in Points Per Play from 0.34 to 0.46, i.e. Michigan’s offense has become more effective turning attempts into points.
8. TO's: Dramatic decline in turnovers (Gee, ya think that might help!?)
   
9. TOP: Significant increase in time of possession by just over 14 minutes.

And that's just on the offensive side of the ball. We’ll revisit these offensive stats each week and see how things are progressing. The above suggests that Michigan offensive coaches Calvin Magee (OC), Rod Smith (QBs), Greg Frey (OL) and Fred Jackson (RBs) as well as head coach Rich Rodriguez are starting to turn the corner on the implementation of the read spread option offense at Michigan.

The Triple Option Play From the Spread Formation: A Nice Overview

Steve Sharik posted a nice piece over at mgoblog about the triple option play out of the spread formation. The progression is similar to the same options observed from conventional triple option plays that most college football fans recognize out of base offensive formations like the "I formation" and "wishbone formation".

The triple option play has been frequently utlized by many read spread option football teams in the past like Utah, Northwestern, Oregon, West Virginia, Florida, and many others. When executed properly, this is a very difficult play to defend against, as the misdirection of the blockers and the QB and tailback fakes frequently places defenders out of position to make the stop. The advantage of perfecting this triple option play is that auxiliary plays tack on to it fairly easily, including regular and play action pass plays, and even run or pass reverse plays, which can really mess with the heads of the opposing defense.

Here's Steve Sharik's post which is a very concise description of the formation, positions, prescribed blocking and progression of the triple option play: Triple Option in the Spread Offense: a Brief Overview (Posted using ShareThis).

This of course begs the question whether Michigan's 2009 quarterbacks will be seen running this play very much? In 2008, I cannot recall a single game where Steven Threet or Nick Sheridan ran a full triple option play with a trailing tailback or a Y or H receiver shimming over into trailing pitch position. I may have missed it.

The answer to the question is yes. Tate Forcier and Denard Robinson both operated spread offenses in high school that utilized the triple option play.

Here is an example at the 2:11 mark of Tate Forcier running only a double-option play out of the spread offensive set, where he pitches the football perfectly to his trailing tailback Brennan Clay (OU commit) for a 35 yard gain versus Oceanside during the final state championship game for Scripps Ranch high school. Oceanside won decisively 49-14.

Here is Forcier running a speed double option play for a touchdown in the game:



I would not be surprised to see the double- and triple-options plays to be incorporated into the Wolverine repetoire at some point early this season, and possibly by the first game.

When Your Punter and Place Kicker Have Nothing to Do

During Tommy Bowden's second season at Tulane, the Green Wave's offensive effectiveness improved so dramatically under offensive coordinator Rich Rodriguez that Tulane's placekickers rarely had anything to do.

Tulane's 1998 spread option offense, which was operated by quarterback Shaun King, combined with the helpful services of speedy tailbacks Toney Converse and Jamaican Dartez, plus slot "machine" receivers Jajuan Dawson, Kerwin Cook and PJ Franklin, became so successful in the red zone, that the scoring statistics of senior Green Wave place kicker Brad Palazzo took a serious nose dive. Palazzo was called upon to kick far more PATs (73 of them!) than field goals (only 9 all year). This was a major step change from the previous 1997 season when Tulane finished 7-4-0.

Still, Palazzo ended up crushing the career field goal record at Tulane that year which had been held previously by former Detroit Lion placekicker and Tulane alum, Eddie Murray (1976-1979).

In 1998 the duties of Tulane's senior punter, Brad Hill, would also be reduced primarily to pooch punting.

And so it was to hell with field goals. Tulane was going to score touchdowns. Lots and lots of touchdowns.

Seventy-three to be precise.

That year Tulane finished 2nd nationally in scoring offense (45.5 points per game). They were ranked 4th nationally in total offense (507 yard per game and over 5,000 total yards) and 13th in the land in passing offense (305 yards per game). In rushing offense, the Green Wave finished 23rd nationally (202 yard per game). Tulane, Kansas State, UCLA and Ohio State were the only four schools in the nation in 1998 to compile 3,000 yards passing and 2,000 yards rushing.

For all of the spectacular read option TD keepers by King, and all of the prolific touchdown runs by Jajuan Dawson, it was Brad Palazzo who led the Green Wave in scoring that year with 100 points.

May Michigan's place kicker Brendan Gibbons and punter Zoltan Mesko find similar respite and notoriety in 2009.

Have You Heard The One About the Spread Being Dead?

Great article today in the Freep by Mark Snyder that touches upon the question of whether or not defenses have "caught up" to the read spread option offense or not. I agree with Rodriguez's response to this question:

"This whole thing about catching up to this, it's all about execution," he said at the Big Ten media days in Chicago last week. "They said the same thing about West Coast offenses, pro-style offenses. If you've got better players, you execute better, you'll win 100% of the time, no matter what system you run.

"Because of the so-called spread, there's so many variations of the spread that's different, it's going to be an easy mark -- 'They're not winning because of the spread.' It ain't the spread, it's the execution of it."

Chris over at the Smart Football blog has also written some excellent articles on this same question.

Have defensive coordinators at the college level "caught up" to all of the ins and outs of the spread offense?

There Is Such A Thing As A Dumb Question
I don't even know what people actually mean when they ask or even suggest that defenses have "caught up" to this or that. Look, I could be wrong here, but from what I've observed so far watching college football in recent years, the spread offense is a spectrum of different sets. There's a lot of different plays that can be called out of the spread formation.

Anyway, the words "spread offense" tends to get people riled up one way or the other. Some love it to death. Others hate it with a passion.

So why not shelve the read spread option offense of Rich Rodriguez for one moment and consider, oh I don't know, the wishbone offense.

In the 1970s and the early 1980s, the wishbone was a widely used offensive set in the Big 8, Southwest and Southeast conferences. Several Big Ten teams ran it as well from time to time, including Michigan State (Charlie Baggett) and even Michigan (Rick Leach). By the mid 1980s usage of this all-popular wishbone offense was starting to wane to the point where only Oklahoma, Arkansas and the military academies (Army, Navy and Air Force) found any value left in it. Defenses were said to be getting faster and getting better line penetration, which started to disrupt the predicable post snap reads and progressions along the line of scrimmage.

OK, so what about the I-formation? Today I-formation sets are very popular in college football, with isolation off-guard or off-tackle run plays, sweeps and trap running plays. Rather unsophisticated, basic, run-it-up-the-gut-type stuff. The I-formation is very easy to employ and extremely versatile as one can do a lot of play action, downfield and screen pass plays, not to mention make frustratingly awesome use of 1 or even 2 tight ends.

So how is it that this notion arises from bloggers, fans and the sports media that defenses have now "caught up to the spread offense", while the I-formation and pro-set offenses somehow remain a complete and utter enigma to all defensive coordinators both professional and collegiate?

This claim doesn't make any sense when placed up against observation, unless you are Gary Danielson and/or you hate Rich Rodriguez.

The truth is, at least at this snapshot in time, that the spectrum of sets called the "spread offense":

1.) Takes many shapes and forms from more run-centric read spread option (Oregon, Michigan, West Virginia) to heavily pass-centric varieties (Texas Tech, Oklahoma, Boise State).

2.) Spread offenses remain a favorite among coaches at almost every level from high school to division II and I college football. We all know that NFL teams have of course employed pass-centric spread sets.

3.) It makes more sense that defensive coordinators first "master" the secret circuitry of Mark Dantonio's I and single-back formations, and Paul Johnson's Flexbone* offense, as both offenses have been around for decades longer than the spread offenses have been.

Guilty by Association
I think it's also important that people not be confused by associating things incorrectly. For example, Oklahoma and Alabama both won national championships in the 1970s running the wishbone offense. They were among dozens of teams employing this tactic to win their football games, but it wasn't the sole reason for their national titles.

Earlier that same decade Nebraska rattled off back to back national titles under Bob Devaney. Well, they must have run the wishbone then!!!!! Not exactly. Devaney ran a multitude of sets including some standard I, some three back Power I (with option plays) and pro set passing formations and was very successful with the players he had.

Florida won national titles under Spurrier with a pass-centric offense and years later again with Urban Meyer operating a read spread option attack.

Texas (spread offense) barely defeated USC (pro set and I-formation) in the national championship game in 2006.

The common denominators among these great, championship teams was the application and use of talented players on the roster, not the offensive system itself.

Oklahoma won the national title in 1976 because of QB Steve Davis, TB Joe Washington, WR Billy Brooks, WR Tinker Owens and DT Lee Roy Selmon. The fact that OU ran the wishbone that year was coincidental.

Defensive Failure in College Football
In my view, I don't think defensive coordinators have caught up to anything in college football. If anything, defenses at the college level have a lot to answer for since about 1999. If someone is making the claim the defenses have evolved and caught up, then they need to explain why teams like Tulsa, Ball State and Western Michigan are racking up 400 yards plus per game in total offense. They then need to explain why Paul Johnson has been so successful implementing an archaic offensive set (the wishbone and derivative Flexbone) at Georgia Tech, even though this set almost went the way of the Dodo bird in 1987.

If you ever get a chance, watch some college football game films from the 1940s and 1950s. It's surprising to see the "option pitches" which they called "lateral passes" and all of the spread passing formations they used at the time. It puts all of this "caught up to" talk into perspective.

Love it or hate it, the spread offense is going to be with us for a long time in college football. And even if it's use starts to wane someday in the future, as the wishbone certainly did in the late 1980s, some coach with ingenuity may pick it back up, dust it off, and make it new for kids to play again.

The Story About A Man Named Jed

One is a story about a man named Jed.

The other is a story by a man named Jed.

Both stories were published on the Quad blog of the New York Times back in 2007. Very interesting reading.

This Jed that is being referred to is Mr. Jed Drenning, Rich Rodriguez's first quarterback for Glenville State College back in 1991.

Drenning is remembered as the quarterback who first ran the shotgun zone read run play - from a broken play where he ran for his life from a crashing defensive end. Rich Rodriguez would later turn that botched pass try into a staple play of his spread option playbook. In the years to come, dozens of other college football programs would follow suit.

Here is the first story: The Evolution of the Broken Play by Pete Thamel. An excerpt:

Rodriguez calls Drenning one of the smartest players he has coached, which is how a bit of ingenuity by necessity was able to give birth to the basic shotgun zone-read run play that West Virginia uses so effectively. In a game early in 1991, Drenning missed or bobbled a handoff and then kept the ball, running for a moderate gain.

“Why did you do that?” Rodriguez asked Drenning.

“The end squeezed in, so I kept it,” Drenning said.

“Oh, right,” Rodriguez said, pretending not to be surprised. “Oh, we’re putting that in next week.”

Years later, Rodriguez laughed when he recalled that moment of discovery.

“It was one of those deals where we kind of fell into that,” Rodriguez said. “We weren’t running it because he wasn’t a runner. But the thought process came in our mind.”

The next story was written by Jed Drenning himself entitled Coach Rod's First Quarterback.
An excerpt:

Either way, Coach Rodriguez adheres to that philosophy and to this day it still serves him –- and his team -– very well. Whether it’s West Virginia’s unique no-huddle, power-spread running game, or the Mountaineers’ odd-stack defense that only a handful of teams across the country employ, or a fake punt in the final minutes of West Virginia’s 2006 Sugar Bowl victory over heavily favored Georgia, Coach Rod is acutely aware of a simple detail that appears lost on many coaches. Kids react favorably to someone who demonstrates the courage to take a chance, and they embrace the notion of circling the wagon and being a part of something that few others have the guts to try.

I really liked these articles. I respect football coaches that have shown the courage to try new things and change the way the game is played, even if they are but small, tectonic-like shifts in philosophy. There's something very special about coaches like Dave Nelson (Wing T), Emory Bellard (wishbone offense), Bill Walsh (West Coast passing offense), Bill Yeoman (veer option), Rich Rodriguez (shotgun spread read option offense), and Chris Ault (Pistol Offense). They all showed some guts to try new things or to enhance what others had tried before them.

This makes me wonder what other tactical discoveries lie around the corner for the game of college football that might significantly change a team's competitive advantage.

For example, can any new discoveries be gleaned from what is already happening with A-11 formations?